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Abstract  
 Tax morale has been recognized as the key to understand the levels of 
compliance achieved in most countries in the world. We applied a structural 
equation model (SEM) to gain a better understanding about the factors 
shaping tax morale of Portuguese taxpayer’s. Our purpose was to analyze 
through SEM the direct effects of political democratic system, political 
participation, religiosity, individual satisfaction, trust in others and 
institutional trust on tax morale. A sample of 1,553 Portuguese individuals 
representative of Portuguese population obtained from European Values 
Study (EVS), carried out in 2008-2010 was used. The results confirmed that 
Portuguese taxpayers´ tax morale is influenced by taxpayers trust on 
institutions like government, parliament and the judicial system, by political 
participation and by the belief that democracy is a good political system for 
governing the country.  Tax morale is also influenced by individual´s 
satisfaction, by religiosity and by societal behavior (trust in others). We 
concluded that tax morale is strongly influenced by political and 
psychological factors. 
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Introduction 
 The reasons underlying taxpayers´ behavior are not yet completely 
understood by researchers and by politicians. Tax morale is understood as 
the intrinsic motivation to comply with fiscal duties (Torgler, 2003) and is 
recognized has having an important role in explaining the high degree of tax 
compliance observed in many countries (Molero and Pujol, 2005; Güth et al., 
2005). Simultaneously, tax morale has a strong negative impact on shadow 
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economy level (Alm and Torgler, 2006; Torgler and Schneider, 2009) and on 
tax evasion (Torgler and Schneider, 2007).  Recently, increased research has 
been developed about tax morale and its main determinants (Alm and 
Torgler, 2006; Alm et al., 2006; Barone and Mocetti, 2011; Cummings et al., 
2009; Frey, 2003; Güth et al., 2005). Additionally, it seems that the concept 
of tax morale still remains open to interpretation (Pope and McKerchar, 
2010). 
 Torgler and Schneider (2005) defined the concept as the intrinsic 
motivation to comply and pay taxes, and thus voluntarily contribute to public 
welfare. A better understanding about individual heterogeneity in shaping tax 
morale may contribute for the development of alternative mechanisms to 
reduce tax evasion (Riahi-Belkaoiu, 2004; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 
2010) and to improve tax compliance. A comprehensive understanding of tax 
compliance should help decision-makers to shape better communication 
policies with taxpayers (Trivedi et al., 2003). Also, tax authorities will be 
able to develop more targeted enforcement strategies for non-compliant 
taxpayers (Devos, 2008). Such measures are of particular importance 
because of the negative consequences that tax evasion has on public 
revenues, on equity level of the tax system (Kim, 2008) and on the 
perceptions of potential foreign investors (Frey, 2003; Richardson, 2006).  
 This paper contributes to the literature by extending previous studies 
about tax morale. Our paper applies SEM in order to study the influence of 
multidisciplinary factors on tax morale. Despite the existence of a 
considerable number of research papers on this topic, we believe that little is 
known, in particular, on the constraints of Portuguese taxpayers’ tax morale. 
Data provided by EVS was used to apply SEM to analyze the factors that 
influence Portuguese taxpayers´ tax morale in 2008. The results achieved are 
a contribution for a better understanding of the factors shaping tax morale. 
The conclusions obtained can be used by politicians and the tax 
administration, in order to improve compliance levels and reduce 
noncompliance and underground economy through the implementation of 
more efficient rules. Given the present challenges faced by Governments, 
studies of this nature can be valuable to promote voluntary tax compliance.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the 
literature on tax morale and its main determinants. Section 3 describes data 
and variables used in the study. Section 4 presents the empirical results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
Literature review and research hipothesis 
 Empirical research clearly shows that taxpayers exhibit a wide range 
of behaviors towards their tax obligations under similar conditions. What 
still remains to be understood are the reasons behind taxpayer’s behavior. 
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Behavioral differences are justified for several motives, ranging from an 
economic point of view (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974) to 
behavioral, political and psychological motivations (Andreoni et al., 1998). 
Traditional economic models based on the economics-of-crime approach 
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) pointed out deterrence factors to explain 
taxpayer’s behavior. However, empirically based studies showed that higher 
levels of compliance were obtained when compared to the ones predicted by 
economic models (Andreoni et al., 1998; Alm et al., 1992; Feld and Frey, 
2002). A proper understanding of taxpayers´ behavior requires the 
consideration of theories referred by sociologists and psychologists (Alm et 
al., 1995). The puzzle of tax compliance can only be understood if research 
takes into account individual´s willingness (Torgler, 2003) and moral 
sentiments, like shame and guilty (Erard and Feinstein, 1994).  
 Tax morale is linked to a civic duty, which can be crucial to explain 
the level of acceptance of a certain tax burden (Martinez-Vazquez and 
Torgler, 2009). It can be conceptualized as a set of moral principles or values 
that individuals have regarding the payment of their taxes (Alm and Torgler, 
2006). Song and Yarbrough (1978) define it as the norms of behavior 
governing taxpayers´ in their relationship with the state. Among the range of 
tax morale definitions provided by the literature, it seems clear that moral 
rules and feelings, equity and the relation between taxpayers and government 
are important factors for an understanding of the concept. 
 Tax morale is a multidimensional concept and requires an 
interdisciplinary approach (Alm and Torgler, 2006). There is no readily 
available objective or observable measure of tax morale (Frey and Torgler, 
2007). There are many advantages in working with a multi-item index 
instead of a single question to measure tax morale (Kirchler, 1997; 1999). An 
analysis of the factors that influence tax morale based on SEM allowed us to 
assess tax morale using three indicators. Simultaneously we avoid the 
disadvantages associated with the construction of an index, especially 
regarding the measurement procedure (Alm and Torgler, 2006).  
 Empirical studies results support the influence of a large number of 
behavioral, political and psychological variables on tax morale. Torgler 
(2005) studied religiosity (church attendance), trust in the President, trust 
people to obey the law, perception of being caught, satisfaction with national 
officers, national pride, pro-democratic attitude and wealth. Alm et al., 
(2006) consider the effect of confidence in the courts, pride and perception 
of tax evasion. Alm and Torgler (2006) considered the effect of confidence 
in the courts, trust in parliament and church attendance. Alm and Torgler 
(2006) referred church attendance, trust in legal system and trust in the 
parliament. Torgler (2006) considered religiosity (church attendance, 
religious education, being active in a church group, importance of religion, 
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religious guidance), corruption and trustworthiness. Torgler and Schneider 
(2007) considered direct democracy, national pride, trust in political 
institutions and government and attitude towards democracy. Barone e 
Mocetti (2011) analyzed public spending inefficiency.  
 From our point of view, analyses of tax morale determinants could be 
improved if those factors were studied simultaneously. In our opinion, we 
can contribute to an improvement in the understanding of factors shaping tax 
morale if the study simultaneously includes a higher number of factors. 
Empirical evidences from other areas, like political science, psychology, and 
sociology show that they influence each other.  
  
Democratic political system 
 A democratic political system is understood as representing, 
according to the opinion of taxpayers, a good political system for governing 
the country. Empirical studies provide evidences of the influence of political 
democratic system on tax morale (for Asian countries see Torgler, 2004; for 
Latin America see Torgler, 2005). Individuals satisfied with how democracy 
has evolved and with the way the country is being governed, have higher 
levels of tax morale. Individual´s support for democracy helps to maintain a 
high level of tax morale (Torgler, 2004; 2005). A democratic political system 
offers citizens the possibility to express their preferences. Also, a more 
active role of the citizens helps them to better monitor and control 
politicians, and thus to reduce the asymmetry of information, which reduces 
the discretionary power of the government (Torgler, 2004). Frey and Stutzer 
(2000) argue that democracy influences happiness through a higher 
satisfaction with policy outcomes. People are happy if they have (and use) 
the opportunity to participate in direct democracy. Dorn et al., (2005) 
observe a significant relation between democracy and happiness. We 
hypothesize that: 
 H 1.1 – Political democratic system positively influences tax morale. 
 H 1.2 – Political democratic system positively influences individual 
satisfaction. 
 
Political Participation 
 Opportunities for political participation contribute to what Lane 
(1988) calls “procedural goods of democracy”. It implies, for instance, 
dignity goods such as self-respect, feeling of personal control or 
understanding and public resonance (Frey and Stutzer, 2006). There are 
several forms of political participation. Some involve active interactions with 
others, like being part of a political party, and others are usually performed 
in an individual manner, for example signing a petition (Quintelier and 
Hoodghe, 2011). Political participation in elections encourages citizens to 
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discuss relevant issues, which helps to improve their political awareness. 
Moreover, knowing that citizens are discussing and monitoring its behavior 
provides government with an incentive to act more effectively. Such 
participation further contributes to more effective governance, by offering 
citizens the opportunity to speak out, and show their preferences. The more 
aware a government is of citizens preferences, the better its policies will 
reflect citizens' needs (Boix and Posner, 1998). Politically interested citizens 
will tend to associate and engage in discussion. Exchange of arguments and 
face-to-face interaction enhances group identification and give citizens the 
opportunity to identify others’ preferences. As these preferences become 
visible, the moral costs of free-riding or behaving illegally increase, reducing 
the justification for corruption and tax evasion. We hypothesize that: 
 H 2.1 – Political participation positively influences tax morale. 
 H 2.2 – Political participation positively influences political 
democratic system. 
 H 2.3 – Political participation positively influences trust in others. 
 
Religiosity 
 Since the 1990´s researchers have paid attention to a discipline called 
“economics of religion” considering mainly two approaches: the economic 
analysis of religious behavior within an economic model, and the study of 
the consequences of religion and religiosity on economic behavior 
(Innaccone, 1998). Religion can be seen as a proxy for characteristics like 
work ethics, tolerance and trust (La Porta et al., 1999). Every society has 
moral constraints, which are not formally laid down (Torgler, 2006), but 
nevertheless influence citizens’ behavior. Many of these standards are highly 
influenced by religious motives (Torgler, 2006). Church as an institution 
induces moral constraints in a community and influences people’s behavior 
(Torgler and Schneider, 2005). Torgler et al., (2008) results support such 
previous findings in that a high sense of religiosity leads to a higher level of 
tax morale. Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle (1997) wrote extensively about the 
effect of individual religiosity, which is related to the development of a sense 
of compassion, honesty and altruism, as well as happiness and quality of life, 
health and mental health. Lehrer (2004) emphasize the positive outcomes 
between being a religious individual and well-being and healthy. Walker 
(2003) concluded that religious experience is important in moral functioning. 
Also, Roccas (2005) found a high correlation between religiosity and values. 
Religiosity induces choices between what is seen as right and wrong 
behavior (Margolis, 1997) Adicionaly, Guiso et al., (2003) found that in 
general there is a positive relationship between religion and trust (toward 
others, in the government and in the legal system). Brañas-garza et al., 
(2009) confirmed the link between religious practices and trust in several 
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institutions (the government, the police, the armed forces, the courts and the 
banks) and trust toward others. Some studies found that religiosity improves 
people´s civic engagement (Wald and Wilcox, 2006). Being a member of a 
religious organization is positively related with political participation 
(Gibson, 2008). Religiosity is used as a proxy to analyze the impact of 
standards imposed by non-governmental organizations or the impact of 
values that promote compliance and punish non-compliance (Torgler, 2007). 
We hypothesize that: 
 H 3.1 – Religiosity positively influences tax morale. 
 H 3.2 – Religiosity positively influences institutional trust. 
 H 3.3 – Religiosity positively influences trust in others. 
 H 3.4 – Religiosity positively influences political participation  
 
Individual Satisfaction 
 The level of happiness of an individual can influence economic 
decisions, including consumption, behavior at work, investment decisions 
and political behavior (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). In this context it will be 
interesting to examine whether the level of happiness of citizens affects their 
tax morale. Many economists have made use of subjective questions on 
welfare (financial satisfaction), well-being, and health satisfaction, among 
others, to address a wide range of scientifically and politically relevant 
questions. The interest of considering happiness as a variable influencing 
individual willingness to comply increases significantly, given that there is 
little empirical evidence on the impact of happiness on tax morale (Torgler 
2004; 2005). Happiness and individual satisfaction were found to have a 
significant positive effect on taxpayers' tax morale in Asian countries 
(Torgler, 2004) and in Latin America (Torgler, 2005). We hypothesize that: 
 H 4.1 – Individual satisfaction positively influences tax morale. 
 
Trust in Others 
 According to Uslaner (2002) people trust others based upon the belief 
that their fellow citizens are part of a moral community. “When we believe 
that “most people can be trusted,” we are more likely to give of ourselves 
and to look out for the welfare of others. When we believe that “you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people,” we are likely to be on our guard and to 
feel little compunction in taking advantage of others who may not have our 
best interests in mind” (Uslaner, 2002: 9). Generalized trust rests upon the 
psychological foundations of optimism and control, which leads people to 
believe that the world is a good place, it is going to get better, and that you 
can make it better Uslaner (2002).  
 Individuals do not act in isolation. They have perceptions about the 
behavior of other individuals. The greater the perception by an individual 
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that others engage on tax evasion practices, the more he will tend to lower 
his level of tax morale (Molero and Pujol, 2005). Similarly, the greater the 
perception, that other taxpayers meet their tax obligations, the greater is the 
individual willingness to pay taxes. Frey and Torgler (2007) also corroborate 
the idea that taxpayers’ behavior depends on the social behavior of other 
taxpayers. In fact, taxpayers are willing to pay their taxes conditionally. If 
trust is matched by trustworthy behavior in others, the costs of dealing with 
risks and uncertainty are reduced (Helliwell, 2001). Also, results from public 
goods experiments suggest that most people are only willing to cooperate if 
they expect others to cooperate as well (Gächter et al., 2004). Trusting other 
citizens and political leaders are two contributing factors for people to pay 
taxes more willingly (Scholz and Lubell, 1998). We can conclude that the 
social context and institutional structure, in which the tax compliance occurs, 
influence the level of tax morale of each taxpayer. We hypothesize that: 
 H 5.1 – Trust in others positively influences tax morale  
 H 5.2 – Trust in others positively influences individual satisfaction 
 H 5.3 – Trust in others positively influences institutional trust.  
 
Institutional trust 
 Institutional trust  measures  the  degree  of  confidence  that 
individuals have in  institutions  (government  and  parliament)  and  public  
administration  of  the  country  where  they  live (OECD, 2007). A 
sustainable tax system is based on a fair tax system and responsive 
government, achieved with strong connection between tax payments and the 
supply of public goods (Bird et al., 2006). The relationship between 
taxpayers and state can be seen as a relational or psychological contract, 
representing   “a   complicated   interaction   between   taxpayers   and   the   
government   in establishing a fair and reciprocal exchange” (Feld and Frey, 
2007: 104) which involves strong emotional ties and loyalties. Institutional 
trust can only be created if the government acts in line with citizens’ needs 
and desires (Hardin, 1998).  Generally, it can be argued that positive actions 
by the state are intended to improve taxpayers’ attitudes and commitment to 
the tax system, and thus enhance compliant behavior (Smith, 1992). If the 
state acts trustworthily, taxpayers might be more willing to comply with 
taxes. On the other hand, perceived unfairness increases the incentive to act 
against the tax law, as it reduces psychological costs. In this context, if 
taxpayers trust the government and the state, their willingness to comply 
with their tax obligations will be higher (Torgler and Schneider, 2007). 
 Cummings et al., (2009) use an experimental setting to show that tax 
morale increases with individual perceptions of good governance. 
Institutions that respect the preferences of the citizens will have more 
support from people than a state that acts as Levianthan (Prinz, 2002). Not 
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only trust in the government may have an effect on tax morale, but also trust 
in courts and the legal system, and thus the way the relationship between the 
state and its citizens is established. Slemrod (2002: 13) points out that costs 
of tax collection and government running are lower if taxpayers are more 
willing to pay their taxes voluntarily: ‘‘It is as if there is a stock of goodwill, 
or social capital, the return to which is the more efficient operation of 
government. This social capital stock may be reduced by a policy change 
that decreases the incentive to be a law-abiding citizen’’. We hypothesize 
that: 
 H 6.1 – Institutional trust positively influences tax morale. 
 H 6.2 – Institutional trust positively influences individual 
satisfaction. 
 
Methodology 
Instrument 
 For our analysis, we used data from EVS survey carried out in 2008 
(EVS, 2010). Year 2008 is the most recent EVS data available for Portugal. 
The EVS is a research project on human values in Europe that explores the 
differences and changes in the values of citizens. The survey provides details 
about ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values and opinions of citizens 
across Europe. By covering a broad variety of questions on different topics, 
EVS has the advantage of reducing the likelihood of respondents´ suspicions 
of surveys´ motivation and reduces the appearance of framing effects that 
may be present in surveys based only on tax compliance questions 
(Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009). EVS (2010) provided us with data to 
measure the constructs referred in the empirical literature as tax morale 
determinants.  
 
Model of research 
 In our proposed SEM tax morale is directly influenced by 
individual´s institutional trust, by the level of trust in others, by political 
participation, by religiosity, by political democratic system and by 
individual’s satisfaction.  
 Democratic political system construct represents Portuguese citizens 
opinion that democracy is the best regime to govern the country and was 
measured with 2 indicators. Political participation represents individual´s 
involvement in political activities on an individual level was measured with 
3 indicators. Religiosity represents moral constraints on individual´s 
behavior was measured with 4 indicators. Individual´s satisfaction with life 
was measured with 3 indicators. Trust in others represents individual´s 
perception of others behavior and was analyzed with 3 indicators. 
Institutional trust allowed us to consider the effects of institutional trust at 
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the current politico-economic level (Alm e Torgler, 2006; Torgler, 2004) and 
at the constitutional level (trust in the legal system/justice system) thereby 
focusing on how the relationship between the state and its citizens is 
established. Institutional trust was measured with 3 indicators. There is not a 
unanimous opinion about the number of indicators a construct should have 
for SEM purposes, It is normally accepted that three or more indicators are 
suitable for analysis SEM (Hair et al., 2009).  
 
Sample and procedure 
 EVS allows us to work with a representative set of individuals of 
Portugal (N = 1,553).  
 Multivariate outliers were evaluated with Mahalanobis squared 
distance (p1 and p2 < 0.001). From an initial sample of 1,553 individuals, 39 
were considered multivariate outliers and were deleted. The final sample 
contains 1,514 individuals.  
 Sample includes individuals aged between 18 and 98 years old with 
an average of 53 years old. Around 59.40% of respondents are women and 
40.60% are male. Most respondents are married (60.00%), around 18.00% 
have never been married or with registered partnership. There are individuals 
from all regions of Portugal, with emphasis for North (39.0%), Center 
(28.4%) and Lisbon (17.4%).  Around 91% of respondents have up to 
(upper) secondary education, 8.1% have first stage of tertiary education and 
only 1% has second stage of tertiary education. Around 67.90% of the 
respondents declare to earn less than € 18,000 a year. However, a significant 
percentage of the respondents (48%) did not answer the question or did not 
new how much their annual income was. Regarding to employment status, 
44.10% of the respondents are employed, 34.10% are retired or pensioned, 
6.5% are housewife, 3.2% are students and 7.6% are unemployed.  
 We applied SEM to test the relationships between the variables 
included in the research framework. For the missing data we applied an 
imputation technique by replacing the missing values by the mean value of 
the responses of the variable (Hair et al., 2009). We used Amos 19.0 to 
generate maximum likelihood parameter estimates through the analysis of 
the matrix of covariance among variable scores. All the complementary 
analyses were conducted using SPSS 19.0.  
 Normality of data was analyzed through skewness (sk) and kurtosis 
(ku) which allowed us to check univariate normality. In AMOS multivariate 
normality is measured by the use of Mardia’s multivariate kurtosis (Mardia, 
1970).   
 Firstly we developed the measurement model supported by the 
literature reviewed. We verified the existence of unidimensionality, adequate 
reliability and validity of all constructs measures using an exploratory factor 
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analysis (EFA) and a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Sample adequacy 
for all variables was assessed by Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (KMO). The 
adequacy of factor analysis was measured with Bartlett test. 
 Scale reliability or internal consistency analysis of the constructs was 
assessed by Cronbach's alpha (α).  A value of α higher than 0.60 is 
considered acceptable and a value greater than 0.7 is considered ideal (Hair 
et al., 2009). However, Nunnally (1967) considers the range of 0.5 to 0.6 is 
acceptable for exploratory research. Another measure of construct reliability 
(CR) was computed from the squared sum of factor loading for each 
construct and the sum of the error variance terms for a construct on the 
measurement model. 
 Construct validity was analyzed with both convergent validity and 
discriminant validity. Convergent validity exists if the indicators of a 
construct have a high portion of variance in common. Convergent validity is 
assured if standardized factor loadings are higher than 0.5 or ideally than 0.7 
(Hair et al., 2009). Other measure of convergence is average variance 
extracted (AVE). AVE values greater than 0.5 (Hair et al., 2009) indicate 
good convergence.   
 Discriminant  validity was assessed through the comparison  of the 
values  of AVE  for each construct  with  the squared  multiple  correlations  
between  two constructs  (Hair  et  al.,  2009). 
 Global model fit was assessed using the Goodness of Fit (GFI) and 
the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). Incremental 
model fit was assessed with the Tucker Lewis Index (TLI), Comparative fit 
index (CFI) and Normed fit index (NFI). Incremental model fit was assessed 
with adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) and Parsimony Normed Fit Index 
(PNFI). 
 
Results and discussion 
 Results showed  values  of  sk between  -1.278  and  2.588,  and  
values  of ku between  -1.545  and  4.699.  All indicators had univariate 
normal distributions. In a conservative assumption of normality for absolute 
values of sk less than ±3 and less than ±10 ku are considered acceptable for 
assumption of normality (Kline, 2004). In our model Mardia’s multivariate 
kurtosis was 51.721. Bentler (2005) considers a cut off value of 5 for the 
assumption of multivariate normality. According to Hair et al. (2009) the 
maximum likelihood method is the most effective when the requirement of 
multivariate normality is verified and has shown to be very robust even in 
the presence of violation of multivariate normality.   
 The measurement model includes twenty indicators and seven 
constructs. Constructs´ unidimensionality was assured through EFA 
procedure. Seven constructs and 21 indicators were evaluated using EFA. A 
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value of KMO = 0.713 obtained is considered acceptable for this type of 
analysis (Hair et al., 2009). The values of Bartlett’s test were χ2 = 7618.568, 
df = 190 and p = .000, which confirmed the appropriateness of the factor 
analysis procedure as used. The principal component method, with a varimax 
rotation was used to extract relevant factors. The EFA results showed that all 
indicators with loadings greater than 0.56 in just one factor, and eigenvalues 
greater than 1 according to Guttman-Kaiser rule (Guttman, 1954; Kaiser, 
1960; Kaiser, 1970) were considered. The measure of sample adequacy 
(MSA) is greater than 0.62 for all variables. The seven-factor (tax morale, 
political participation, democratic political system, religiosity, individual 
satisfaction, trust in others and institutional trust) solution obtained explained 
66.355 percent of the total variance.  
 All constructs present a value of Cronbach's alpha (α) higher than 
0.6, except for individual satisfaction with a 0.573 value. Values of CR 
greater than 0.7 suggest good reliability (Hair et al., 2009). All constructs CR 
values ranged from 0.7 to 0.9, showing good reliability. We concluded that 
all constructs presented acceptable reliability for this analysis purpose. 
 CFA shows standardized loading estimates greater than 0.5 except for 
two indicators: job security and religious services. All constructs have AVE 
values greater than 0.46. These results suggest the existence of convergent 
validity.  
 We concluded that all constructs of measurement model show 
discriminant validity. The matrix of factor score weights for CFA model 
show that indicators associated to each construct present high scores and 
have residual scores in all other constructs. 
 Tax morale measurement model exhibits good global fit indicators 
with GFI = 0.976 and RMSEA = 0.031. Values of GFI higher than 0.9 and 
RMSEA between 0.3 and 0.8 are considered good (Hair et al., 2009). TLI = 
0.963, CFI = 0.971 and NFI = 0.953, suggest good incremental fit indicators. 
According to Hair et al., (2009) values of TLI greater than 0.95 and values of 
NFI and CFI greater than 0.9 suggest good fit. The model also presents good 
parsimony fit indicators with AGFI = 0.967 and PNFI = 0.747. Hair et al., 
(2009) recommends values of AGFI greater than 0.95 and values of PNFI 
greater than 0.5. 
 Final SEM of tax morale determinants included six endogenous 
constructs and one exogenous construct. Tax morale is influenced by 
institutional trust, by religiosity, by political participation, by trust in others, 
by individual satisfaction and by the political democratic system. 
Institutional trust is influenced by religiosity and trust in others. Political 
participation depends on religiosity. Individual´s satisfaction is influenced by 
trust in others, by institutional trust and by political democratic system. 
European Scientific Journal August 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
247 
Political democratic system depends on political participation. Trust in others 
is influenced by political participation and by religiosity. 
 SEM model presents good global fit indicators with GFI = 0.976 and 
RMSEA = 0.031. For incremental fit TLI = 0.964, CFI = 0.971 and NFI = 
0.951. For the Parsimony fit AGFI = 0.967 and PNFI = 0.776. All values are 
considered good fit indices (Hair et al., 2009). SEM has χ 2(155) =373.170 
and so the Normed Chi-square (χ 2/df) is 2.408 (p<0.001). Hair et al., (2009) 
recommends a value less than 2 for an acceptable model. However, Kline 
(1998) argues that a value of 3 or less is acceptable. Considering that the 
Normed Chi-square is sensitive to sample size and considering our study has 
a sample greater than 1,000 observations, we concluded that Normed Chi-
square of 2.408 is acceptable. Our SEM presents good fitness indicators. 
Table I presents structural model direct effects. 
Table I – Structural model direct effect analysis 
Structural relationships (direct 
effects) 
Estimate t-
Value 
Hypothesis Expected 
sign 
p-
Value 
Political Democratic System Tax 
morale 
0.665 4.887 H 1.1 + *** 
Political Participation Tax 
morale 
-0.217 -
2.831 
H 2.1 + 0.005 
Religiosity Tax morale 0.161 2.598 H 3.1 + 0.009 
Individual Satisfaction Tax 
morale 
0.193 5.527 H 4.1 + *** 
Trust in Others Tax morale -0.142 -
3.103 
H 5.1 + 0.002 
Institutional Trust Tax morale -0,127 -
1.617 
H 6.1 + 0.106 
Political Democratic System 
Individual Satisfaction 
0.733 4.620 H 1.2 + *** 
Political Participation  Political 
Democratic System 
0.185 7.606 H 2.2 + *** 
Political Participation  Trust in 
others 
0.478 6.087 H 2.3 + *** 
Religiosity  Institutional Trust 0.155 5.731 H 3.2 + *** 
Religiosity  Trust in Others 0.156 2.267 H 3.3 + 0.023 
Religiosity  Political 
Participation 
-0.206 -
7.363 
H 3.4 + *** 
Trust in Others  Individual 
Satisfaction 
0.323 5.666 H 5.2 + *** 
Trust in Others  Institutional 
Trust 
0.141 7.184 H 5.3 + *** 
Institutional Trust  Individual 
Satisfaction 
0.233 2.440 H 6.2 + 0.015 
 
 In general, we find support for the hypothesis that behavioral, 
political and psychological variables influence Portuguese taxpayer’s 
intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. SEM show direct effects of a 
European Scientific Journal August 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
248 
multidisciplinary set of constructs on the formulation of tax morale. Political 
democratic system, political participation, religiosity, individual satisfaction 
and trust in others have a direct significant influence on tax morale 
formulation. Democratic political system and individual satisfaction present 
the highest positive statistically significant effect on the formulation of 
individual´s motivation to comply. Furthermore, we also conclude that 
political democratic system positively contributes to individual satisfaction. 
Individuals who believe that democracy is the best government regime tend 
to state high levels of tax morale and satisfaction with life. Similarly, 
individual´s satisfied with their life´s tend to exhibit higher tax morale. 
Individual taxpayers are negatively statistically significant influenced by 
behavior of the other taxpayers. The knowledge that other individuals are not 
trustworthy reduces the motivation to act according the rules and to comply. 
 Religiosity presents a positive statistically significant effect on tax 
morale, although with lower influence compared to democratic political 
system, individual satisfaction and trust in others. Regarding to Portuguese 
taxpayers, a higher commitment to obey non-governmental rules increase 
their tax morale level and stands for an increasing level of institutional trust. 
Commonly, empirical studies analyze the impact of religiosity on tax morale 
just with one indicator, church attendance. We measured religiosity using 
four indicators. In our understanding this is more appropriated given the 
multidimensional dimension of the concept. Among the four indicators 
considered in the analysis, the one that contributes more to capture 
individual´s religiosity level is the level of trust individual’s state on church.  
 Political participation and trust in others behavior present a negative 
statistically significant effect on tax morale. Taxpayers with a higher level of 
political participation are less willing to pay their taxes unconditionally. 
Active individual´s in political activities, in an individual level, like signing 
petitions, joining boycotts and be part of manifestations, present lower levels 
of tax morale. Commonly empirical studies present a positive relation 
between political participation and tax morale. Our result is not in line with 
previous studies. The result obtained in our study can be explained by the 
fact that most people stated that would never do any of the referred 
individual political activities, like signing a petition (mean = 2.26, Std. 
0.777), joining boycotts (mean = 2.64, Std. 0.566) and be part of 
manifestations (mean = 2.46, Std. 0.691). Literature review showed that 
knowing that other people are trustworthy increases the motivation to act 
according the rules and to comply. However our study revealed a negative 
influence of trust in others behavior and tax morale. In our understanding, 
the result achieved because a high percentage of taxpayers stated high levels 
of tax morale and also stated the perception that people do not try to be fair 
or just look out for themselves. 
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 Many empirical studies about tax morale determinants evidence a 
positive relation between institutional trust, and tax morale. When citizens 
believe governments act according to their interests willingness to comply 
increases. Our results show a negative not statistically significant relation 
between institutional trust and tax morale. We justified our result based on 
the fact that, in average, citizens report a low level of trust on government, 
parliament and justice system. Trust in parliament (mean = 2.80, Std. 0.802), 
trust in justice system (mean = 2.68, Std. 0.869) and trust in government 
(mean =3.01, Std. 0.834).     
 Political participation presents a positive and statistically significant 
relation with political democratic system with trust in others. People with 
high levels of political participation believe democracy is the best political 
system and are more aware of others behavior. Individuals who engage in 
political activities tend to state that others are trustworthy. Religiosity 
presents a positive and statistically significant relation with institutional trust 
and a negative and with trust in others.  Religiosity presents a negative and 
statistically significant relation with political participation. People who are 
strongly influence by non-governmental institution are less willing to engage 
acts like petitions or manifestations. 
 Trust in others presents a positive and statistically significant relation 
with individual satisfaction and with institutional trust. Institutional trust 
presents a positive and statistically significant relation with individual 
satisfaction. Trust in public institutions contributes for satisfaction with life. 
 
Conclusion and limitations 
 This paper contributes to the debate about the determinants of tax 
morale using a structural equation model. Using data from EVS regarding to 
Portugal, year 2008, we explored the direct and indirect effects of political, 
behavioral and psychological factors on tax morale. Tax morale gains 
importance in tax compliance research given the limitations of traditional 
economic models to explain taxpayers behavior. The intrinsic motivation to 
pay taxes is a key factor to provide an explanation about taxpayer’s behavior 
over the years. It is also a crucial variable to explain tax evasion levels and 
the level of underground economy. Individual´s tax morale is a 
multidimensional concept not directly observable. So the study of the factors 
that shape it seem to give awareness to researchers and politicians of how to 
maintain or even increase individual´s motivation to comply. 
 Our work extends previous empirical studies by analyzing 
simultaneously the influence of political democratic system, political 
participation, religiosity, individual satisfaction, trust in others and 
institutional trust on the formulation of Portuguese taxpayers tax morale. 
Most of the estimated coefficients of tax moral causes analyzed in our model 
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are statistically significant at conventional levels. We conclude that 
Portuguese taxpayers tax moral is positively influenced by individual 
satisfaction and by democracy. Our results seem to indicate that, in Portugal, 
individual’s intrinsic motivation to pay taxes is positively influenced by the 
existence of a democratic political regime and by individual´s satisfaction 
with life. However, we did found a not significant negative relation between 
institutional trust and tax morale. Individuals who support democracy as the 
best political regime, individual´s satisfied with their lives and strongly 
identified with the country tend to have a higher intrinsic motivation to 
comply. Thus, for Portuguese taxpayers, political and social conditions are 
important to explain the level of motivation to comply.  
 We studied a wide range of constructs as determinants of tax morale, 
although it is justifiable to state that further constructs could have been 
included. In the choice of the constructs and the indicators to be included in 
the model we were limited by the variables included in the EVS.  
 This paper provides detailed insights into Portuguese taxpayers tax 
morale and thus contributes to understanding why so many taxpayers in 
Portugal are willing to pay their taxes. 
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